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This paper examines listing location as a managerial decision by using a sample of IPOs of Chinese 
entrepreneurial firms in mainland China, the United States and Hong Kong. We find that Chinese 
entrepreneurial firms managed by CEOs with international experience are more likely to undertake 
foreign IPOs, especially those returned from countries with more advanced legal institutions and 
those operating in high-tech industries. The credibility crisis for Chinese firms in 2010 switched 
the focus of foreign IPOs from the US to Hong Kong. These results are consistent across returnee 
CFOs and other senior executives with international experience. 
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 The human capital of the management team is important to the development of 
entrepreneurial firms (Chen, 2011; Zhang, 2017; Zimmerman, 2008), and various individual traits, 
such as leadership, expertise, experience, gender, and personality, are found to affect firm 
outcomes in entrepreneurship studies (Bruneel et al., 2018; Carter et al., 2007; Shrader and Siegel, 
2007; Zona, 2016). Wilson et al. (2007) suggest that background or past experience may affect 
both personal effectiveness and future employment options; hence, international experience may 
not only be beneficial to returnees’ 1  career development but may also contribute to the 
development of their employers’ business. No country sends more students overseas than China 
does every year, growing from 144,500 in 2007 to 413,900 in 2013.2 The role of Chinese returnee 
entrepreneurs in science start-ups has been studied by Wright et al. (2008) among others. However, 
the impact of returnees on the internationalization of entrepreneurial firms is unclear. In this study, 
we examine the role of CEOs’ international experience on IPO listing decisions of Chinese 
entrepreneurial firms.  
Although the capital markets of emerging markets provide good opportunities to access the 
external equity capital, the poor investor protection hammers the valuation and growth of firms 
(La porta et al., 2002). Firms from countries with relatively low investor protection enjoy long-
term growth by conducting IPOs in foreign countries with strong investor protection (Doidge et 
al., 2004). In particular, undertaking IPOs in foreign developed capital markets could help 
entrepreneurial firms improve their corporate governance (Cumming et al., 2015) and a better 
information environment (Baker et al., 2002). 
                                                 




Due to institutional differences and information asymmetries, entrepreneurial firms 
headquartered in emerging markets have to face the disadvantages of foreignness and of newness 
when undertaking foreign IPOs in developed capital markets (Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997; 
Certo, 2003)3. Existing literature in entrepreneurship studies shows that several factors could help 
entrepreneurial firms overcome such barriers and help them to list in foreign capital markets. These 
include venture capital participation (Hursti and Maula, 2007; Cheng and Schwienbacher, 2016), 
technological orientation (Hursti and Maula, 2007), or top management team foreign experience 
(Hursti and Maula, 2007). However, the literature has not studied the impact of CEOs with 
international experience on undertaking foreign IPOs in entrepreneurial firms. 
This study focuses on CEOs because they play a key role in corporate decision-making. 
For example, Blankespoor et al., (2017) argue that the international experience of a CEO may 
reduce information asymmetry through the presentations in IPO roadshows, which is positively 
associated with IPO outcome. They also possess the foreign networks resources and the tacit 
knowledge of advanced foreign institution (An et al., 2017) that could facilitate the firms to access 
to foreign markets. We expect that returnee CEOs could help overcome barriers of foreignness and 
newness that Chinese entrepreneurial firms face when listed abroad, and hence affect the appeal 
of a foreign listing. 
 We focus on IPOs in Growth Enterprise Markets (GEM) to test the impact of returnee 
CEOs on the listing choices because GEMs provide financial opportunities with flexible listing 
requirements. Using a hand-collected sample of 355 IPOs in the ChiNext board market, 33 IPOs 
in the NASDAQ market, and 23 IPOs in the HK Growth Enterprise Market between 2009 and 
                                                 
3 Private firms face the liability of newness because potential investors know less information for firms undertaking IPOs. In 
addition, those private firms of emerging markets undertaking IPOs in foreign developed capital markets further suffer the liability 
of foreignness, because it extends beyond the walls of the firms to include the macroeconomic and institutional environment of the 
firm’s country of origin (Hymer, 1960). 
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2012, we find that entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are more likely than firms without to 
list on the US or HK markets rather than the ChiNext market. The likelihood of a foreign IPO is 
greater if returnee with overseas experience in countries with more advanced legal institutions. 
Prior to the press reports of financial fraud of US-listed Chinese firms the influence of returnee 
CEOs was more pronounced when the entrepreneurial firms operated in high-tech industries. 
However, this preference does not survive after 2011. We also find that entrepreneurial firms with 
returnee CEOs are negatively associated with IPO underpricing until 2011 in the US market are 
associated with higher IPO pricing, and subsequently have the lower first day return. The 
credibility crisis also spread to Chinese firms listed in the HK market, where returnee CEOs were 
not significantly associated with IPO underpricing after 2011.4 Finally, since the characteristics of 
the top management team has an impact on the IPO decision (Hursti and Mauls, 2007) and their 
performance (Zimmerman, 2008), we also test the impact of other senior executives with 
international experience on foreign IPOs. The results are consistent.  
 This paper makes four main contributions to the literature. First, this is the first study of 
the role of Chinese returnees in the foreign IPO choice of entrepreneurial firms. The literature 
mainly focuses on the impact of returnee entrepreneurs in early-stage entrepreneurial firms 
(Wright et al., 2008; Filatotchev et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2010; Filatotchev et al., 2011; Lin et al., 
2016). Although a few studies have examined the impact of returnee entrepreneurs on 
internationalization by focusing on the channel of exportation in start-ups (Filatotchev et al., 2009), 
the role of returnee CEOs of entrepreneurial firms in undertaking foreign IPOs is not clear. Second, 
this paper is related to studies on the impact of top management team member characteristics on 
the development of entrepreneurial firms (Chen, 2011; Zhang, 2017; Hursti and Mauls, 2007; 
                                                 
4 There is no Chinese entrepreneurial firm listed on the HK GEM (Growth Enterprise Market) board in 2009 and 2010 in our sample. 
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Zimmerman, 2008). Chen (2011) examines the role of guanxi in influencing the decision of an 
individual to be an entrepreneur facing a risky technology or to become a worker facing an 
unemployment rate. Zhang (2017) shows the importance of elder managers helps firms to realize 
the potential benefits of agglomeration. Hursti and Mauls (2007) study the international experience 
of the top management team reduces the home bias of companies in choosing IPO markets. 
Zimmeman (2008) finds that top management team heterogeneity, for example in terms of the 
functional background or educational background, is associated with greater capital accumulation. 
We contribute to this strand of the literature by finding that the international experience of the 
CEO, chair, CFO, and other senior executives has an impact on undertaking foreign IPOs. Third, 
this paper is related to empirical studies exploring the factors that could affect the foreign IPOs of 
entrepreneurial firms (Cheng and Schwienbacher, 2016; Zhang and Yu, 2017). Finally,  
 
2. Institutional Background 
 Although privately owned companies are the cornerstone of Chinese economic growth 
(Allen et al., 2005), these private entrepreneurial firms often face financial constraints (Poncet et 
al., 2010; Ding et al., 2013). In developed countries, second board capital markets are normally in 
place to facilitate equity financing of entrepreneurial firms. For example, growth enterprise 
markets (GEMs) have been widely established for the development of innovative entrepreneurial 
enterprises, including NASDAQ in the US, the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the UK, 
and Catalist in Singapore. In October 2009, ChiNext, China’s GEM, was launched in the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange to ‘promote the development of innovative enterprises and other growing start-
ups,’5 and 355 entrepreneurial firms were listed by the end of 2012. The listing requirements of 
                                                 
5 http://www.szse.cn/main/en/ListingatSZSE/ListingQA/  
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the ChiNext board are substantially more flexible than those of the main board market. For 
example, one of the requirements of the ChiNext board is that accumulated profits cannot be less 
than RMB 10 million and must represent continued growth in the last two years, while the SZSE 
main board requirement is that net profits cannot be lower than RMB 30 million in aggregate over 
the last three years.6 The ChiNext board provides a new platform for the financing of all types of 
entrepreneurial firms, and offers significant opportunities to returnees. For example, more than 30 
returnees became billionaires after the first round of IPOs on the ChiNext board in October 2009.7 
3. Theory and Hypotheses Development 
3.1 IPO Markets Selection 
Since 2009 Chinese firms have a choice between access the ChiNext and GEMs in other 
countries. Although GEMs in both China and overseas countries provide good opportunities to 
access external capital, firms seeking IPOs in the foreign capital market are motivated to improve 
the corporate governance (Cumming et al., 2015) or a better information environment (Baker et 
al., 2002). In particular, firms from countries with relatively low investor protection enjoy long-
term growth by conducting IPOs in foreign countries with strong investor protection (Doidge et 
al., 2004).  
However, entrepreneurial firms from emerging markets face challenges to access and raise 
funds from the foreign developed equity capital market. In addition to language, culture, and 
distance obstacles, issuer companies from emerging markets primarily suffer from the cost of the 
liability of foreignness (Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). The liability of newness (Certo, 2003) is 
                                                 
6 http://www.szse.cn/main/en/ListingatSZSE/ListingRequirements/  
7 http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/cybfh/  
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also seen as an additional barrier for entrepreneurial firms aiming to raise funds from the foreign 
equity capital market, as firms often have a short operating history and little publicly available 
information. The compounded cost of both the liability of foreignness and newness are challenging 
for entrepreneurs from emerging economies trying to access developed equity capital markets. 
There are two potential explanations. Firstly, the entrepreneurial firm may be undervalued due to 
the information asymmetry between the issuer from the emerging economy and the prospective 
investors from the developed countries. For instance, prospective may be concerned about the 
institutional development and legitimacy of emerging economies (Cumming et al., 2015), as 
issuers may lack important effective governance mechanisms (Peng et al., 2008). Foreign investors 
may fail to fully appreciate the success of privately owned firms from emerging countries. 
Conversely, foreign IPOs may be disadvantaged by limited understanding of the legal, market, and 
regulatory systems of the “host market” (Cumming et al., 2015). This two way unfamiliarity may 
reduce the valuation of IPOs from emerging countries in developed capital markets. 
 Secondly, foreign issuers may lack both the foreign network resources and the foreign 
institutional expertise in the IPO market. The IPO process relies on several financial service 
institutions, such as underwriters, lawyers, venture capitalists, and auditors. Without a connection 
to these financial service institutions that shape IPO outcomes entrepreneurial firms are less likely 
to conduct IPOs in foreign markets (Florida and Kenney, 1988; Pollock et al., 2004; Mason and 
Pierrakis, 2013).  
 According to the “signaling theory”, managers could help signal the quality of IPO firms 
to potential investors, and reduce the information asymmetry (Certo, 2003). Wu et al. (2007) 
further show that managers would be a signal to the market by utilizing a personal credit line to 
finance their businesses. We argue that the international experience of returnee CEOs could help 
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Chinese entrepreneurial firms effectively reduce the liabilities of foreignness and newness by 
sending “internationalization signal” and “bonding signal” to potential investors in IPOs. More 
specifically, first, since returnees could benefit from the international experience, returnee CEOs 
possess the knowledge of the developed capital market and send an effective signal that 
entrepreneurial firms can alleviate the legitimacy issue (Certo, 2003; Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 
2001a). This could help foreign IPO firms to reduce the information asymmetry for potential 
foreign investors, and then overcome the liabilities of foreignness and newness. Blankespoor et al. 
(2017) further confirm importance of CEOs in IPO process by studing the IPO roadshow 
presentations. They find that perceptions of a CEO, as observed in during IPO roadshow 
presentations, are positively related to IPO pricing, which implies that CEOs could help reduce 
information asymmetry. Second, Chinese returnees have access to social network resources and 
foreign institutional expertise from international professional, academic, and general life 
experience. Returnee CEOs also have the ability to help entrepreneurial firm issuers effectively 
communicate with financial institutions. We therefore expect that Chinese entrepreneurial firms 
with returnee CEOs are more likely to go public in developed foreign capital markets compared 
with those without returnee CEOs.  We thereby develop our hypothesis 1a below. 
Hypothesis 1a: Chinese entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are more likely to 
undertake IPOs in developed foreign markets. 
Since the strength of the legal institution varies around the world (La porta et al., 1998) 
and the strong investor protection is associated with high corporate valuation (La porta et al., 2002), 
returnee CEOs with experience of countries with stronger legal institutions have better 
understanding the importance of investor protection. La porta et al. (1998) find that English 
common law counties are associated with better investor protection comparing with French civil 
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law countries because of the strict enforcement of the law. Therefore, CEOs returned from “host 
countries” with stronger legal institutions may be more familiar with the US and HK market. The 
legal institutions could be measure by three ways following (La porta et al., 1998): 1) whether the 
legal origin of the “host country” is common law; 2) assessment of the law and order tradition in 
the “host country”; 3) the assessment of the corruption in government of the “host country”8. We 
therefore also predict that the likelihood of a foreign IPO is greater if the returnee CEO has the 
overseas experience in the countries with more advanced legal institutions. 
Hypothesis 1b: H1a is more pronounced for returnee CEOs returned from countries with 
more advanced legal institutions. 
3.2 Moderating Effects for High-tech Industries 
High-tech entrepreneurial firms may perceived as risky by investors (Daily, Certo, & 
Dalton, 2005). Hursti and Maula (2007) argue that high-tech firms seek overseas investors because 
they are more likely to understand the associated risks. Pagano et al. (2002) and Hursti and Maula 
(2007) find that R&D intensive firms and high-tech firms are more likely to seek foreign IPOs, 
where venture capital markets are more developed and such market would have better perception 
about the riskiness of technological oriented firms. More importantly, countries with strong 
shareholder protection further help entrepreneurial firms to increase the long-run rates of R&D 
investment (Brown et al., 2013), which is important for high-tech firms. Thus, we hypothesize the 
following: 
                                                 
8 The high score indicate lower corruption in the “host country”. 
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Hypothesis 2: Returnee CEOs are more likely to undertake foreign IPOs if their firms 
operate in high-tech industries. 
3.3 Moderating Effects for the Credibility Crisis 
Muddy Waters (MW) LLC is an investment research firm that conducts business research 
for the public and also undertakes short selling. Its research focuses on business fraud, accounting 
fraud, and other fundamental business problems and may include short-selling firms before 
adverse publicity comes to light. MW came to prominence by successfully revealing several 
fraudulent Chinese companies listed on US markets which preceded sharp falls in the issuers stock 
price. For example, MW reported that Orient Paper9, a U.S.-listed Chinese firm, greatly overstated 
their revenues on 28 June 2010, and the stock price of the company fell by about 56% in the 
following 220 trading days. 
This series of disclosures of fraud by Chinese companies by triggered a number of fraud 
investigations of Chinese firms listed on the US market, and further caused a credibility crisis at 
the market level.10 Jindra et al. (2012) document that Chinese firms listed on the US market are 
increasingly subject to investigations and securities class actions since 2010 and this led to a 
decrease in firm value. This sends a signal of mistrust and opacity of Chinese entrepreneurial firms 
in the US capital market. Consequently, US-listed Chinese firms tend to face a difficult 
environment, which has discouraged IPO in the US market and the number of Chinese IPOs in 
NASDAQ has dropped substantially since 2011. Although returnee CEOs are viewed as the signal 
of trust and transparency of entrepreneurial firms, they still cannot reverse the negative impact of 
                                                 
9 http://www.muddywatersresearch.com/research/orient-paper-inc/initiating-coverage-onp/ 




credibility crisis on the demand and the firm valuation in the market level. Thus, we hypothesize 
the following: 
Hypothesis 3: Chinese entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are more likely to avoid 
undertaking IPOs in the US market after 2011. 
4. Research Method 
4.1 Sample and Data Collection Procedure 
 To test our hypotheses, we identify 355 IPOs of entrepreneurial firms from the Shenzhen 
ChiNext board market, 33 IPOs of entrepreneurial firms from the NASDAQ market and 23 IPOs 
of entrepreneurial firms from the Hong Kong second board market from China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database11. We mainly rely on CSMAR and cross check with 
media coverage to obtain IPOs in the NASDAQ market. IPOs in the NASDAQ market include 
issuing common shares and issuing American Depositary Receipts (ADR) shares. In addition, our 
sample excludes IPOs that transfer from the OTC board to NASDAQ as the information on these 
entrepreneurial firms has already been available to the public investor before listing on the 
NASDAQ market. In our research, we only focus on the first time entrepreneurial firm transitions 
from a private owned firm to a publicly owned firm. 
 The prospectuses are downloaded from cninfo.com.cn (Shenzhen ChiNext board market), 
hkexnews.hk (Hong Kong second board market) and EDGAR (NASDAQ market). We hand 
collect returnee CEOs by reviewing the short biographies in the IPO prospectuses. In addition, 
firm characteristics, governance characteristics and personal characteristics prior to the IPO are 
manually collected from the IPO prospectuses.  
                                                 
11 Companies going public through reverse mergers are not included in the sample. 
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4.2 Dependent Variables 
Choice of Market. In order to explore whether an entrepreneurial firm with a returnee 
CEO or chair chooses the domestic or foreign market, we use three variables measuring the choice 
of market when entrepreneurial firms go public. China vs US&HK is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the entrepreneurial firm chooses to list on the domestic market (Shenzhen ChiNext board 
market), and equal to zero if the entrepreneurial firm chooses to list on the foreign market (Hong 
Kong second board market or NASDAQ market). China vs US is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the entrepreneurial firm chooses to list on the domestic market (Shenzhen ChiNext board 
market), and equal to zero if the entrepreneurial firm chooses to list on the US market (NASDAQ 
market).  
IPO Underpricing. We use IPO first day return to measure the IPO underpricing. IPO 
first day return is measured as the percentage difference between the offer price and the closing 
price of the first trading day (Certo et al., 2001a).  
4.3 Independent Variables 
Returnee CEO. CEOs are identified as returnees if they have had overseas working 
experience, overseas studying experience, overseas permanent residence or foreign nationality. 
CEOs are not identified as returnees if they work, study or live in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. 
Returnee Chairman. Board chairmen are identified as returnees if they have had overseas 
working experience, overseas studying experience, overseas permanent residence or foreign 
nationality. Board chairmen are not identified as returnees if they work, study or live in Hong 
Kong, Macau and Taiwan. 
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Returnee CFO. CFOs are identified as returnees if they have had overseas working 
experience, overseas studying experience, overseas permanent residence or foreign nationality. 
CFOs are not identified as returnees if they work, study or live in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. 
Other Returnee Senior Executives. Other senior executives, including vice-president, 
executive directors, vice-chairman, board secretaries or other senior level executives, are identified 
as returnees if they have had overseas working experience, overseas studying experience, overseas 
permanent residence or foreign nationality. Other senior executives are not identified as returnees 
if they work, study or live in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. 
4.4 Control Variables 
 Following the previous IPO literature, we control for firm-level effects including firm size, 
firm age, venture capital (VC) ownership, high technology industry, the log of issuance size. Firm 
size is measured by the nature logarithms of total assets in the financial year prior to the IPO. Firm 
age is measured as the difference in years between the IPO firm’s founding date and the date of 
the IPO (Daily et al., 2003). VC ownership is the ratio of VC holding shares among total shares 
before IPOs. Following Certo et al. (2001b), the high tech dummy is equal to one if firms are 
operating in the high technology industry sectors including computer hardware, computer software, 
semiconductors and printed circuits, biotechnology, telecommunications, and pharmaceuticals. 
High tech IPOs in mainland China and Hong Kong are classified by China Listed Company 
Industry Classification Guidelines and Global Industry Classification Standard, respectively. 
Following Cheng and Schwienbacher (2016), we also control the log of issuance size. The amount 
of the issuance size is calculated by Chinese RMB for all companies. 
 To reflect differences in corporate governance we control for the board size and the board 
independence. Previous studies show that the board size is positively associated with firm 
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performance (Certo et al., 2001b; Dalton et al., 1999) and is related to environmental resources 
(Certo et al., 2001a). We measure board size as the number of board directors prior to the IPO. 
Daily et al. (2005) argue that a board predominated by independent directors is a signal that 
effective monitoring and control systems are in place. Board independence is measured by the 
percentage of independent directors on the board prior to the IPO. 
 We also control for founder CEO, CEO duality, CEO age. Founder CEO is controlled for 
as the CEO founder status has an impact on IPO valuation and is perceived as uncertainty (Certo 
et al., 2001b). Founder CEO codes as a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is the founder, 
and zero otherwise. We also control for whether the CEO is the chair of the board. CEO age is 
measured by the age of CEO prior to the IPO. Descriptive statistics and the correlations between 
all variables used in our regression models are reported in tables one and two. 
 Year effects and industry effects are included in all regressions. The year ranges from 2009 
to 2012. Industry effect variables are constructed by the first two-digit of Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS).  
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Figure 1 shows the distribution of foreign IPOs 
over time and Figure 2 the distribution of the host countries for returnee CEOs. Descriptive 
statistics are given in Table 1. 
“Insert Figure 1 and 2” 





5.1 Market Selection  
 To test the impact of returnee CEOs on market selection (H1), we regress Returnee CEO 
on China vs US&HK, China vs US and China vs HK using probit regression models. The results 
are shown in Table 2. Year effects and industry fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
Industry effect variables use the first two digits of the Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS). All coefficients reported are the average marginal effects. In column 1, the coefficient of 
returnee CEO (0.0924, z=4.01) shows that entrepreneurial firms led by returnee CEOs are 9.24% 
more likely to choose to list on the US and HK markets over the mainland China market, at the 1% 
level. To show that our results are not driven by any specific developed equity capital market, we 
partition the sample of firms listed in HK and US markets to conduct the test separately. In column 
2, the coefficient of returnee CEOs (0.0517, z=3.48) indicates that entrepreneurial firms led by 
returnee CEOs are 5.17 % more likely to choose to list on the US market rather than the mainland 
China market, at the 1% level. In column 3, the coefficient of returnee CEOs (0.1030, z=2.6) 
indicates that entrepreneurial firms led by returnee CEOs are 10.30 % more likely to choose to list 
on the HK market rather than the mainland China market, at the 1% level. The results support 
Hypothesis 1a, that entrepreneurial firms led by returnee CEOs are more likely to list on developed 
overseas markets 12 . In all three models our results suggest that returnee CEOs have an 
economically significant impact on choice of listing locations with an estimated 9.24% due to 
returnee CEOs. 
“Insert Table 2 Here” 
                                                 
12 Figure 2 shows that there is no observations for firms listed on HK market during 2009-2010. To avoid the bias of selection, we 
further test the column 2 and column 3 in table 2 by restricting the sample period during 2009 to 2010 and during 2011 to 2012, 
separately. The results are robust. 
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To test H1b regarding the likelihood of a foreign IPO is greater if the returnee CEOs have 
the overseas experience in advanced legal institutions, we regress Returnee CEO * Common Law, 
Returnee CEO * Rule of Law, Returnee CEO * Corruption on China vs US&HK using probit 
model. The results are reported in Table 3. All the coefficients reported are the average marginal 
effects. In column 1, the coefficient of Returnee CEO* Common Law (0.0942, z=4.09) shows that 
entrepreneurial firms led by returnee CEOs with overseas experience in common law countries are 
9.42% more likely to choose to list on the US and HK markets over the mainland China market, 
at the 1% level,. In column 2, the coefficient of Returnee CEO * Rule of Law (0.0188, z=3.95) 
shows that entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs having overseas experience in countries with 
stronger rule of law are 1.88% more likely to choose to list on US and HK markets at 1% level. In 
column 3, the coefficient of Returnee CEOs * Corruption (0.0132, z=4.00) shows that 
entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs having overseas experience in countries with lower 
corruption are 1.32% more likely to choose to list on US and HK markets at 1% level. The results 
provide evidence to support Hypothesis 1b, imply that the overseas experience in countries with 
advanced legal institutions are more likely to get listed on foreign markets. 
“Insert Table 3” 
5.2 Moderating Effects for High-tech Industry and Muddy Water Research 
 To test Hypothesis 2, we further incorporate the interaction term between Returnee CEO 
and high-tech in column 1 of Table 4. All coefficients reported are the average marginal effects. 
We regress the interaction term of Returnee CEO and high-tech on China vs US using probit 
regression analysis, and show the results in Panel A of Table 4. The coefficient (0.0870, z=1.70) 
of the interaction term indicates that entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are more likely to 
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undertake IPOs in the US and HK markets when they operate in high-tech industries. The results 
support our Hypothesis 2. 
 To test Hypothesis 3, we incorporate Post2011 (dummy variable defined in Appendix) and 
the interaction term between Returnee CEO and Post2011 in column 2 of Table 4. All coefficients 
reported are the average marginal effects. We regress the interaction term of Returnee CEO and 
Post2011 on China vs US by using probit regression analysis, and present the results in Panel B of 
Table 4. The coefficient (-0.0554, z=-2.13) of the interaction term (Returnee CEO*Post2011) 
indicates that entrepreneurial firms led by returnee CEOs are less likely to be listed in the US 
NASDAQ market than the ChiNext board market after 2011, which supports our prediction.  
“Insert Table 4 Here” 
5.3 IPO Underpricing 
 According to signaling theory (Certo, 2003; Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001a) and 
Blankespoor et al. (2017), if CEOs reduce information asymmetry, then firms could increase the 
IPO price. We test whether entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are related to IPO pricing in 
foreign IPOs. IPO underpricing, which is here measured by the IPO first day return, is an indicator 
of information asymmetry. If returnee CEOs facilitate foreign IPOs by reducing information 
asymmetry, firms with returnee CEOs could have higher IPO pricing, and then the first day return 
may be lower. Furthermore, the Muddy Water effect could also affect IPO pricing in the US market 
by increasing risk. Therefore, we predict that entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are 
negatively associated with IPO underpricing in the US market before 2011, and the negative 
relation disappears after the credibility crisis. Entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are 
negatively associated with IPO underpricing in the HK market after 2011, because the credibility 
crisis did not affect the HK market. To test our prediction, we regress Returnee CEO, US Market, 
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and the interaction term of Returnee CEO and US Market on IPO first day return. The results are 
shown in Panel A of Table 5. Firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, year effects, and industry 
effect are included in the regression. In column 1 of Table 5, Panel A, the coefficient (-0.3882 , 
t=-2.07) of Returnee CEO*US Market indicates that entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are 
negatively related to IPO underpricing in US markets before 2011, at the 5% significance level. In 
column 2 of Table 5, Panel A, the coefficient (0.2199, t=1.39) of Returnee CEO*US Market 
indicates that entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are not related to IPO underpricing in US 
markets after 2011, due to the credibility crisis in the market level. In addition, we also test whether 
the credibility crisis influences the valuation of returnee CEOs in the HK market. The results are 
shown in Panel B of Table 5. The coefficient (-0.1440, t=-1.34) of Returnee CEO* HK Market 
indicates that entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are not significantly associated with lower 
IPO underpricing in the HK market after 2011. The results provide complementary evidence that 
returnee CEOs send a good signal and could reduce information asymmetry, which is in line with 
Blankespoor et al. (2017).  
“Insert Table 5 Here”  
5.4 Reverse Causality 
An alternative interpretation of our results could be that an entrepreneurial firm may 
appoint a returnee as the CEO before the IPO for window-dressing purposes: a form of reverse 
causality. To address this concern by using three subsamples. Firstly, we examine the subsample 
in which CEOs are also founders. Since founders are in charge of the firm daily operation from 
the establishment of the firm, they are unlikely to be appointed as CEOs as window dressing. We 
firstly limit our sample firms with founder CEOs. Secondly, we examine the subsample in which 
CEOs are also board chairs. Since the chairman of the board is normally the largest shareholder of 
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the entrepreneurial companies in China, CEOs that serve as chairs are often ultimate controllers, 
and manage firms for a long time prior to IPO proposal. Therefore, they are unlikely to be 
appointed as CEOs for the window dressing purpose. Thirdly, we examine the subsample in which 
CEOs are also founders or CEOs are also chairs of the board because founders or chairs of the 
board are unlikely to be appointed CEOs for window dressing purpose. 
We split the sample by whether CEOs also serve as chair, and test the role of returnee 
CEOs in foreign IPOs in the subsample of chairman CEOs. Thirdly, we examine the subsample in 
which CEOs are also both board chairs and founder. The results in Table 6 replicate the regression 
analysis of column1 of table 2, and all coefficients reported are the average marginal effects. In 
column 1, the coefficient of Returnee CEO (0.1040, z=2.86) indicates that the results hold for 
founder CEO subsample. In column 2, the coefficient of Returnee CEO (0.1017, z=3.48) indicates 
that the results hold for chairman CEO sample. In column 3, the coefficient of Returnee CEO 
(0.1612, z=3.49) indicates that the results hold for both founder and chairman CEO subsample. 
Thus, our results are unlikely to be impacted by reverse causality. 
“Insert Table 6 Here”  
 The reverse causality issue may also be driven by the concern of sample selection bias. We 
further address the potential observable sample selection bias with a one-to-one nearest neighbor 
PSM approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). We use a Logit regression model using the 
explanatory variables including firm size, firm age, high-tech, board size, board independence, VC 
back with considering industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. Based on the closest 
propensity-score without replacement, each of the 67 firms managed by a returnee CEO is matched 
with another similar firm managed by a non-returnee CEO. 
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Panel A of Table 7 shows that the difference of observable determinants variables between 
the firms with returnee CEOs and firms with local CEOs is not significant in the propensity-score 
matched sample. In Panel B, we conduct the difference in mean test for undertaking Foreign IPOs. 
We find that China vs US&HK for firms managed by returnee CEO all significantly higher than 
for firms managed by non-returnee CEOs. The result is robust and indicates that the potential 
observable sample selection bias is less like to bias our baseline results. 
“Insert Table 7 Here” 
 
5.5 Management Team  
  Since prior literature shows that the top management team has an impact on IPO decisions 
(Hursti and Mauls, 2007) and the performance of IPOs (Zimmeman, 2008), we also test the impact 
of other top management team members with international experience on IPO market selection. 
To conduct the test, we identify the returnee status of board chairmen, CFOs, and other senior 
executives (e.g. vice-president, executive directors, vice-chairman, and board secretaries) from 
their IPO biographies. We test whether other top management team members with international 
experience affect foreign IPOs, and report the probit regression results in Table 8. All coefficients 
reported are the average marginal effects. In column 1, the coefficient of Returnee Chairman 
(0.0605, z=2.69) shows that entrepreneurial firms led by returnee chairmen are 6.05% more likely 
to choose to listed on the UK and HK markets than the mainland China market at 1% level. In 
column 2, the coefficient of returnee CFOs (0.1811, z=5.75) shows that entrepreneurial firms led 
by returnee CFOs are 18.11% more likely to choose to list on the US and HK markets than the 
mainland China market, at the 1% level. In column 3, the coefficient of other returnee senior 
executives (0.1071, z=4.64) shows that entrepreneurial firms led by other returnee senior 
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executives are 10.71% more likely to choose to list on the US and HK markets than the mainland 
China market, at the 1% level. 
“Insert Table 8 Here”  
  
6. Conclusion 
Previous studies have investigated whether returnees outperform locals in contributing to 
the value of entrepreneurial firms (Wright et al., 2008; Filatotchev et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2010; 
Filatotchev et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2016). Our study extends this analysis by examining whether 
returnee CEOs affect IPO market selection and IPO underpricing. We find that entrepreneurial 
firms led by returnee CEOs tend to choose to list on foreign capital markets, especially when 
returnee CEOs have experience in countries with more advanced legal institutions and those 
operating in high-tech industries. However, Chinese entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs 
avoid listing on NASDAQ after 2011, following to the MW credibility crisis. The credibility crisis 
did not spread to the Hong Kong market, and entrepreneurial firms with returnee CEOs are 
negatively associated with IPO underpricing. Our results extend the current research into the effect 
of returnees on IPO market selection and contribute to the literature on foreign IPOs. Our insights 
benefit from the foreign network resources and the institutional expertise perspectives for 
analyzing the role of returnees. The findings have significant implications for policymakers and 
practitioners. 
Although this paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the effect of returnee CEOs on 
entrepreneurial firms and finds robust and reliable results, the study has limitations that open 
avenues for future research. Firstly, we do not have the data to identify CEO’s networks nor the 
quality of these connections. Secondly, prospectuses do not disclose detail concerning any venture 
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capital background, and we were unable to identify the nationality of venture capital investors. 
Thirdly, the sample period of the study only covers five years due to the restriction of hand-collect 
data. Future studies could usefully explore the impact of returnees’ connections and quality on 
foreign IPOs and IPO performance, and investigate the impact of local versus foreign venture 
capital. Evidence from other emerging economies would helpfully expand our knowledge of 
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Returnee CEO Dummy variable equal to one if the CEO has overseas work experience, overseas study experience, 
overseas permanent residence, or holds a foreign nationality, and zero otherwise. 
CEO Age The age of the CEO at the time of the IPO. 
Firm Size The natural logarithm of total sales in the latest fiscal year before the time of the IPO. 
Board Size The number of directors on the board at the time of the IPO. 
Board Independence The percentage of independent directors on the board at the time of the IPO. 
VC Back Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is backed by VC at the time of the IPO, and zero otherwise. 
High-Tech Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is classified as a high-tech firm, and zero otherwise. 
Firm Age The age of the firm at the time of the IPO. 
Founder CEO Dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is the founder at the time of the IPO, and zero otherwise. 
CEO Duality Dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is the chairman at the time of the IPO, and zero otherwise. 
IPO Underpricing The percentage difference between the offer price and the closing price on the first trading day. 
China vs US&HK Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed on the NASDAQ or HKEX markets, and zero 
otherwise. 
China vs US Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed on the NASDAQ market, and zero if the firm is listed 
on the ChiNext market. 
Post2011 Dummy variable equal to one if the IPO year is 2011 or 2012, and zero otherwise. 
US Market Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed on the NASDAQ market, and zero if the firm is listed 
on the ChiNext market. 
HK Market Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed on the HKEX market, and zero if the firm is listed on 
the ChiNext market. 
Year effects The year ranges from 2009 to 2012. Some year effect variables may be automatically omitted in different 
regressions. 
Industry effects Constructed by the first two digits of the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). Some industry 
effect variables may be automatically omitted in different regressions. 
Returnee CEO * Common 
Law 
CEOs are classified  as returnees  from common law countries if they have had overseas work 
experience, overseas study experience, overseas permanent residence rights or foreign nationality in the 
English common law countries.  Source: La Porta et al. (1998) and Allen et al. (2005). 
Returnee CEO * Rule of 
Law 
Returnee CEO is equal to the rule of law index of the host countries and Non-returnee CEO is equal to 
the rule of law index of China. The higher value indicate the stronger rule of law. Source: La Porta et 
al. (1998) and Allen et al. (2005). 
Returnee CEO *  
Corruption 
Returnee CEO is equal to the corruption index of the host countries and Non-returnee CEO is equal to 
the corruption index of China. The higher value indicate the lower corruption.  Source: La Porta et al. 
(1998) and Allen et al. (2005). 
Returnee Chairman Dummy variable equal to one if the board chairman has overseas work experience, overseas study 
experience, overseas permanent residence, or foreign nationality, and zero otherwise. 
Returnee CFO Dummy variable equal to one if the CFO has overseas work experience, overseas study experience, 
overseas permanent residence, or foreign nationality, and zero otherwise. 
Other Returnee Senior 
Executives 
Dummy variable equal to one if the other senior executives have overseas work experience, overseas 
study experience, overseas permanent residence, or hold foreign nationality, and zero otherwise. 
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Figure 1 Distribution of Foreign IPOs over Time 




Table 1 Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics of variables in this paper. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. The sample includes IPOs of Chinese 
firms listed in the ChiNext market, NASDAQ market, and HKEX market from 2009 to 2012. 
Variables China Mainland US HK China — US China — HK US — HK 
 Obs Mean SD Median Obs Mean SD Median Obs Mean SD Median Mean in Diff Mean in Diff Mean in Diff 
Returnee CEO 355 0.13 0.34 0 33 0.30 0.47 0 23 0.43 0.51 0 -0.17** -0.3024*** -0.1317 
CEO Age 355 45.16 5.62 45 33 44.39 6.66 43 23 47.91 9.98 43 0.77 -2.7525 -3.5191 
Founder CEO 355 0.54 0.50 1 33 0.76 0.44 1 23 0.52 0.51 1 -0.22*** 0.0191 0.2358* 
CEO Duality 355 0.53 0.50 1 33 0.61 0.50 1 23 0.39 0.50 1 -0.08 0.1383 0.2148 
Firm Size 355 19.31 0.63 19.25 33 19.61 1.07 19.66 23 18.32 0.87 18.28 -0.30** 0.9929*** 1.2935*** 
Board Size 355 8.38 1.40 9 33 6.21 1.69 6 23 6.57 1.47 6 2.17*** 1.8151*** -0.3531 
Board Independence 355 0.37 0.05 0.33 33 0.48 0.15 0.5 23 0.50 0.13 0.5 -0.11*** -0.1307*** -0.0168 
VC Back 355 0.09 0.10 0.06 33 0.68 0.47 1 23 0.26 0.45 0 -0.08 0. 4180*** 0.1343*** 
High-Tech 355 0.36 0.48 0 33 0.64 0.49 1 23 0.13 0.34 1 -0.27*** 0.2329*** 0.5059*** 
Firm Age 355 8.31 4.61 8.46 33 8.61 2.860 9 23 11.96 6.55 9 -0.30 -3.6462** -3.3505** 
IPO Underpricing 355 0.34 0.36 0.25 33 0.10 0.36 -0.01 23 0.18 0.28 0.08 0.24*** 0.1562** -0.0853 
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Table 2 Returnee CEOs and Foreign IPOs  
This table reports the probit regression analyses between Returnee CEO and listed market selection. All the 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. The coefficients reported are average marginal effects. T-values are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variables China vs US&HK China vs US China vs HK 
Returnee CEO 0.0924*** 0.0517*** 0.1030*** 
 (4.01) (3.48) (2.60) 
Firm Size 0.0178 0.0298*** -0.0553*** 
 (1.19) (3.19) (-4.23) 
Board Size -0.0406*** -0. 0240*** 0.0141** 
 (-4.71) (-4.29) (2.03) 
Board Independence 0.6533*** 0.3262*** 1.0499*** 
 (4.75) (3.53) (4.02) 
VC Back 0.0245 0.0411*** -0.04122* 
 (1.13) (2.90) (-1.79) 
High Tech 0.08974*** 0.0643*** -0.0028 
 (3.14) (3.33) (-0.10) 
Firm Age 0.0076*** 0.0051** 0.0023* 
 (3.28) (2.23) (1.80) 
Founder CEO 0.0314 0.0427*** -0.0116 
 (1.33) (2.75) (-0.45) 
CEO Duality -0.0690** -0.0461** -0.1371*** 
 (-2.42) (-2.53) (-3.41) 
CEO Age -0.0027* -0.0016 0.0002 
 (-1.66) (-1.32) (0.09) 
CEO Ownership 0.1449** 0.1017** 0.2395** 
 (2.00) (2.14) (2.26) 
MBA 0.0189 0.0052 0.0755*** 
 (0.69) (0.24) (2.65) 
Year effects YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.5984 0.7112 0.7538 




Table 3 The Strength of Host Countries’ Legal institutions. 
 
This table reports the probit regression analyses between host countries’ legal institutions and listed market 
selection. Returnee CEO, Common Law, Rule of Law and Corruption are dropped by the model due to 
multi-collinearity. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. The coefficients reported are average 





Variables China vs US&HK China vs US&HK China vs US&HK 
Returnee CEO * Common Law 0.0942***   
 (4.09)   
Returnee CEO * Rule of Law  0.0188***  
  (3.95)  
Returnee CEO * Corruption   0.0132*** 
   (4.00) 
Firm Size 0.0179 0.0185 0.0177 
 (1.20) (1.22) (1.17) 
Board Size -0.0406*** -0.0402*** -0.0407*** 
 (-4.73) (-4.53) (-4.65) 
Board Independence 0.6503*** 0.6670*** 0.6674*** 
 (4.74) (4.67) (4.76) 
VC Back 0.0250 0.0263 0.0270 
 (1.16) (1.22) (1.24) 
High Tech 0.0902*** 0.0891*** 0.0887*** 
 (3.19) (3.11) (3.10) 
Firm Age 0.0074*** 0.0077*** 0.0076*** 
 (3.24) (3.36) (3.31) 
Founder CEO 0.0289 0.0327 0.0308 
 (1.22) (1.38) (1.30) 
CEO Duality -0.0663** -0.0714** -0.0691** 
 (-2.31) (-2.46) (-2.41) 
CEO Age -0.0027* -0.0028* -0.0027* 
 (-1.65) (-1.67) (-1.65) 
CEO Ownership 0.1431** 0.1451** 0.1433** 
 (1.99) (1.99) (1.98) 
MBA 0.0182 0.0191 0.0185 
 (0.67) (0.70) (0.67) 
Year effects YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.5999 0.5964 0.5972 
N 411 411 411 
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Table 4 High-tech Industry and Muddy Water Research 
 
This table reports the probit regression analyses between Returnee CEO and listed market selection, by 
moderating effects of high-tech industries and Muddy Water research. All the variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. The coefficients reported are average marginal effects. T-values are in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variables Panel A  Panel B 
 China vs US&HK  China vs US&HK 13 
Returnee CEO 0.0454  0.0733*** 
 (1.33)  (4.04) 
High-tech 0.0633**  0.0600*** 
 (2.03)  (3.12) 
Returnee CEO*High-tech 0.0870*   
 (1.70)   
Post2011   -0.0623** 
   (-2.10) 
Returnee CEO*Post 2011   -0.0554** 
   (-2.13) 
Firm Size 0.0151  0.0285** 
 (1.01)  (3.11) 
Board Size -0.0417***  -0.0229*** 
 (-4.91)  (-4.13) 
Board Independence 0.6138***  0.3453 *** 
 (4.76)  (3.70) 
Firm Age 0.0076***  0.0053** 
 (3.36)  (2.38) 
VC Back 0.0293  0.0501*** 
 (1.41)  (3.33) 
Founder CEO 0.0394*  0.0420*** 
 (1.72)  (2.77) 
CEO Duality -0.0674**  -0.0473** 
 (-2.45)  (-2.71) 
CEO Ownership 0.1347*  0.1003** 
 (1.87)  (2.14) 
CEO Age -0.0030*  -0.0018 
 (-1.85)  (-1.55) 
MBA 0.0185  0.0058 
 (0.70)  (0.28) 
Year effects YES  YES 
Industry effects YES  YES 
R2 0.6071  0.7185 
N 411  388 
 
                                                 
13 We exclude observations that list on Hong Kong second board market because there is no IPOs of Chinese firm in 2009 and 2010 
naturally. Including IPOs of Chinese firms in Hong Kong may induce the selection bias. 
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Table 5 Returnee CEOs and Foreign IPO Underpricing 
This table reports the OLS regression analyses between Foreign IPOs with returnee CEOs and IPO 
underpricing, by split sample. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. T-values are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
                                                 
14 We do not test the IPO underpricing in Hong Kong second board market before 2011 because there is no IPOs of Chinese firm in 
2009 and 2010 naturally. 
 
Variables Panel A  Panel B 
 IPO Underpricing IPO Underpricing  IPO Underpricing 
 Before 2011 After 2011  After 201114 
Returnee CEO 0.1529* 0.0363  0.0317 
 (1.70) (0.58)  (0.50) 
US Market -0.3924*** -0.1200   
 (-2.73) (-1.35)   
Returnee CEO*US Market -0.3882** 0.2199   
 (-2.07) (1.39)   
HK Market    -0.1529 
    (-1.48) 
Returnee CEO*HK Market    -0.1440 
    (-1.34) 
Firm Size -0.0370 -0.1027***  -0.1065*** 
 (-0.91) (-3.10)  (-3.43) 
High-tech -0.0834 -0.0343  -0.0435 
 (-1.12) (-0.60)  (-0.78) 
Board Size -0.0305* -0.0371*  -0.0322 
 (-1.73) (-1.88)  (-1.59) 
Board Independence 0.0921 -0.8539**  -0.6079 
 (0.26) (-2.01)  (-1.50) 
Firm Age 0.0059 0.0079*  0.0060 
 (1.04) (1.78)  (1.43) 
VC Back 0.1121** -0.0475  -0.0534 
 (2.07) (-1.12)  (-1.35) 
Founder CEO 0.0090 -0.0095  -0.0197 
 (0.16) (-0.20)  (-0.42) 
CEO Duality -0.0279 -0.0349  -0.0365 
 (-0.45) (-0.53)  (-0.59) 
CEO Ownership -0.2992* 0.1644  0.1655 
 (-1.68) (0.90)  (0.97) 
CEO Age 0.0008 0.0026  0.0018 
 (0.18) (0.72)  (0.53) 
MBA 0.0309 0.0711  0.0503 
 (0.37) (1.09)  (0.78) 
Constant 1.3197 2.5387***  2.8393*** 
 (1.45) (3.59)  (4.24) 
Year effects YES YES  YES 
Industry effects YES YES  YES 
R2 0.455 0.158  0.164 
N 181 207  225 
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Table 6 CEO, Founder Duality and Chairman Duality 
This table reports the probit regression analyses between Returnee CEO and listed market selection by 
subsamples. Panel A reports the results based on subsample in which CEOs are also founders. Panel 
B reports the results based on subsamples in which CEOs are also chairmen. Panel C reports the results on 
subsample in which CEOs are also founders and chairmen.  All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
The coefficients reported are average marginal effects. T-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variables Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
 China vs US&HK  China vs US&HK  China vs US&HK 
Returnee CEO 0.1040***  0.1017***  0.1612*** 
 (2.86)  (3.48)  (3.49) 
Firm Size 0.0272  0.0156  0.0194 
 (1.16)  (0.80)  (0.83) 
High-tech 0.1161***  0.0674*  0.0653 
 (2.87)  (1.71)  (1.20) 
Board size -0.0502***  -0.0616***  -0.0871*** 
 (-4.51)  (-4.77)  (-4.59) 
Board Independence 0.6917***  0.2927  0.4345* 
 (3.43)  (1.53)  (1.84) 
Firm Age 0.0136***  0.116***  0.0174*** 
 (3.18)  (3.17)  (2.90) 
VC Back 0.0712**  0.0265  0.0408 
 (1.96)  (0.88)  (1.13) 
CEO Ownership 0.1903*  0.0741  -0.0008 
 (1.85)  (1.11)  (-0.01) 
CEO Age -0.0046  -0.0014  -0.0068 
 (-1.11)  (-0.46)  (-1.49) 
MBA 0.0057  0.1987  0.0318 
 (0.13)  (0.37)  (0.79) 
CEO Duality -0.6099     
 (-1.18)     
Founder CEO   0.0883**   
   (2.17)   
Year effects YES  TES  YES 
Industry effects YES  YES  YES 
Pseudo R2 0.6048  0.7138  0.7087 






Table 7 Returnee CEOs and Foreign IPOs: Propensity-score Matched Sample 
This table reports results for the impact of returnee CEOs on foreign IPOs in the propensity-score matched sample. Panel A present the mean in 
difference between returnee CEO and non-returnee CEO by determinants. Panel B present the mean in difference between returnee CEOs and non-
returnee CEOs by Foreign IPOs in a propensity-matched sample. All the variables are defined in the Appendix 1. T-values are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Determinants of firms with returnee CEOs 
 Returnee CEOs (R) Predicted Returnee CEOs (P) R-P 
 Mean Mean Mean in Diff 
Firm Size 19.2439 19.3927 -0.1488 
Board Size 8.1791 8.4478 -0.2687 
Board Independence 0.4057 0.3960 0.0097 
VC Back 0.7164 0.7313 -0.0149 
High-Tech 0.3881 0.3433 0.0448 
Firm Age 9.5841 9.2803 0.3038 
#Observations 67 67  
    
Panel B: Foreign IPOs 
 Returnee CEOs (R) Predicted Returnee CEOs (P) R-P 
 mean Mean Mean in Diff 
China vs US&HK 0.2985 0.1493 0.1493** 








Table 8 Chairman, CFO, Other Senior Executives and Foreign IPOs 
This table reports the probit regression analyses between Returnee Chairman, Returnee CFO, and Other 
Returnee Senior Executives and listed market selection. All the variables are defined in Appendix 1. The 
coefficients reported are average marginal effects. T-values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variables China vs US&HK China vs US&HK China vs US&HK 
Returnee Chairman 0.0605***   
 (2.69)   
Returnee CFO  0.1811***  
  (5.75)  
Other Returnee Senior Executives   0.1071*** 
   (4.64) 
Firm Size 0.0223 0.0139 0.0188 
 (1.31) (1.26) (1.17) 
Board Size -0.0381*** -0.0233*** -0.0385*** 
 (-3.82) (-3.06) (-4.59) 
Board Independence 0.6823*** 0.7786*** 0.7459*** 
 (4.24) (5.72) (5.41) 
VC Back 0.0350** 0.0217 0.0218 
 (2.52) (1.04) (1.00) 
High-Tech 0.0912*** 0.0768*** 0.0949*** 
 (3.46) (3.15) (3.30) 
Firm Age 0.0085*** 0.0054*** 0.0077*** 
 (3.83) (2.76) (3.98) 
Founder CEO 0.0451* 0.0268 0.0345 
 (1.75) (1.36) (1.53) 
CEO Duality -0.0552** -0.0323 -0.0505** 
 (-2.13) (-1.64) (-2.17) 
Year effects YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES 
Pseudo R2 0.5648 0.7174 0.6127 
N 411 411 411 
 
 
